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SUMMARY
Hungary received several major investments
in the automotive industry in the first half
of the 1990s, after decades in which the in-
dustry had been confined largely to making
components. As a settling-down period had
passed, further investment usually followed,
for investors bought sites, of considerable
size along with options on neighbouring
sites and cost-benefit analysis showed
clearly it was not economical to leave such
sites unused.
The magnitude of these investments is
clear from the examples of Opel, which had
invested over DEM 1 billion by late 2001
and of Audi, with over DEM 2 billion. The
total that Suzuki invested is confidential, but
probably lies in the range of USD 350–400
million. Over 750,000 private cars and
nearly 8.2 million engines were built be-
tween 1992 and late 2001. The importance
of the industry emerges from the fact that
every fourth or fifth passenger car sold in
Hungary is made locally and every 25th to
27th car sold worldwide has a Hungarian-
made engine.
The passenger-car industry in the
COMECON period, with 20 domestic compa-
nies, was much smaller in size and impor-
tance than Hungary’s bus and truck-
making industry. After the transition, bus
and truck production declined rapidly and
the new Hungarian car industry, coupled
with the Western links (including subcon-
tracting) developed by many suppliers
caused a marked shift in the structure of the
background industry towards carmaking.
The structure of the industry did not
evolve in an organic way. Thanks to the fa-
vourable conditions in the early 1990s, a
number of multinational automotive firms
established affiliates in Hungary, mainly in
Transdanubia. These factories usually per-
form classic subcontracting, importing all
the necessary materials and sub-assemblies
and exporting the bulk of the final produc-
tion. Due to the heavy concentration of pro-
duction and the large profits allocated to
Hungarian affiliates, the share of this
handful of firms in the total turnover of the
industry is greater than their share of em-
ployment or value added.
Many Hungarians expected small and
medium-sized firms in the background in-
dustry to strengthen rapidly as the EU and
overseas automotive industry entered to
Hungary. These expectations proved to be
exaggerated. Most Hungarian firms strug-
gled for survival, and since they were un-
dercapitalized, were able to join in the mul-
tinational networks only on the lowest, least
profitable level. System suppliers, or first-
tire suppliers are very rare, and most firms
had to accept second-tire supplier positions.
The meagre profits that could be realized at
this low level in the automotive pyramid,
have been unable to support major mod-
ernization of technology. The ascent of the
pyramid expected by politicians will proba-
bly begin very slowly. Nevertheless, there
are hopes that Hungarian background in-
dustry may move up the hierarchy later, (i)
because wherever there is production, the
need for development appears sooner or
later, and, (ii) because it is almost as diffi-
cult to get out of the chain, as it is to get in.
A car model is usually made for 8–10 years,
so that the outside supplies are required for
a similar period. Furthermore, smooth co-
operation makes the best reference for ob-
taining new orders or involvement in prod-
uct development.
Carmakers in developed countries
choose their first-tier suppliers from firms
able to achieve consistently high technical
and economic performance. This is espe-
cially true today, when the global concen-
tration and lean production systems in the
automotive industry have reduced the num-
ber of firms with which carmakers develop
direct cooperation links. The affiliates of big
carmakers do not usually become reliant on
local background industry. They prefer in-
stead to continue cooperating with tradi-
tional suppliers. Replacing traditional sup-
pliers with local companies is a slow and
burdensome process. Furthermore, big car-
makers are reducing the number of their
suppliers worldwide. They are therefore
giving contracts to large and properly
capitalized firms in Central and Eastern
Europe. Very few firms in Hungary qualify
in this respect.
Under the circumstances, makers in-
vesting in Hungary tried to convince their
established suppliers to follow them and in-
vest in Hungary as well. All makers empha-
size their intention of increasing local value
added. (In the case of Opel’s new CVT gear-
box, the target is 16 per cent.) But this
mainly means contributions from other
wholly foreign-owned affiliates, even in the
case of initiatives by foreign investors to
map and utilize the potentials of Hungarian
background industry. There is, of course,
nothing wrong with having widespread FDI
in the Hungarian automotive industry. Such
ventures are especially welcome from the
employment point of view. Component
manufacture is usually labour intensive (for
example the production of cables).
Another category of background in-
dustry consists of medium-sized Hungar-
ian-owned firms. These firms have had
troublesome histories – emotional privati-
zation with substantial capital pre-emption
(reduction) and delayed restructuring. De-
spite these drawbacks, they are still serious
constituents of Hungary’s industrial poten-
tial. However, in the view of managers,
these firms are at once too big and too
small. They are too small to invest on the
same scale as multinationals can, but they
are too big to benefit from the state support
aimed at SME development, where the usual
ceilings are 250 employees and a turnover
of USD 8 million. These firms also require
special attention from industrial policy-
makers. According to managers, this should
include increased customs protection and
cheap development credits.
Finally, mention must be made of
SMEs, whose role in the Hungarian auto-
motive industry is increasing. They can be
regarded as winners by the transition proc-
ess and its associated foreign investment.
This applies especially to the partly foreign-
owned firms that have successfully joined in
the Suzuki cooperation network.
With competitiveness, the part played
by foreign firms in spreading the Western
industrial standards in Hungary has to be
mentioned. Although quality is not new, the
introduction of Western corporate attitudes
and philosophies affects economic integra-
tion much more readily than any adminis-
trative effort at harmonization. The best
results have come in product quality, where
Hungarian manufacturing figures are
among the best in the world. Less successful
has been the implantation of just-in-time
systems. Despite improvements, punctuality
measured in minutes is not yet characteris-
tic in Hungary, so that relatively high stock
levels are still required.
51) MULTINATIONAL CARMAKERS IN
HUNGARY
Hungary received several major investments
in the automotive industry in the first half
of the 1990s, after decades in which the in-
dustry had been confined largely to making
components. The magnitude of these in-
vestments is clear from the examples of
Opel, which had invested over DEM 1 bil-
lion by late 2001 and of Audi, with over
DEM 2 billion. The total that Suzuki in-
vested is confidential, but probably lies in
the range of USD 350–400 million.
Several factors explain this move into
Hungary by major carmakers. At the time
when the decisions were being taken, Hun-
gary was unrivalled in its region for eco-
nomic openness, legal infrastructure and
general progress with the political transi-
tion from state socialism to capitalism. Also
desirable by comparison with other Central
and Eastern European countries were its lo-
cation, relatively developed travel infra-
structure and close ties with the EU. Hun-
gary already had numerous cooperation
links with Western firms. It was seen as a
country with high levels of technical skills
and education, and a creative, innovative
labour force able to work independently,
receptive to new ideas and willing to learn.
This meant it could perform to the standard
of a Western labour force under adequate
management and control, but at far lower
cost. However, cheap labour alone would
not have been a sufficient incentive to relo-
cate production, since the automotive in-
dustry today is highly technology intensive.
Finally, the government was offering a gen-
erous, ten-year package of tax incentives to
firms investing in the sector: a tax holiday
in the first five years, followed by 60 per
cent of the normal tax bill in the second five
years. However, the 100 per cent relief
could extend to the second five years if
trading profits were reinvested in Hungary.
The last was especially beneficial for com-
ponent producers, who can make quick re-
turns on their investments. Other incentives
were provided on a piecemeal basis:
* several hundred million Hungarian
forints in state subventions to infra-
structure development,
* state guarantees for syndicated loans,
* support for training,
* contributions in kind to investment
schemes in the form of cheap premises,
* customs-free imports,
* advantages related to industrial free-
trade zones,
* cheap public utilities,
* and in some cases (such as Audi), con-
sent for continuous working.
These factors ensured that foreign car
manufacturers could count produce ade-
quate quality at very low cost. Further in-
vestment usually followed, after a settling-
down period, as investors bought sites of
considerable size along with options on
neighbouring sites. Cost-benefit analysis
showed clearly it was not economical to
leave such sites unused (Tables 1 and 2).
Over 750,000 private cars and nearly
8.2 million engines were built between
1992 and late 2001. The importance of the
industry emerges from the fact that every
fourth or fifth passenger car sold in Hun-
gary is made locally and every 25th to 27th
car sold worldwide has a Hungarian-made
engine.
The Audi investment, the largest proj-
ect in Hungary, exceeded DEM 2 billion by
late 2001. The German investors chose the
Hungarian location in November 1992 (out
of 180 potential sites in Europe) to manu-
facture engines with five valves per cylin-
der. Audi Hungaria Motor Kft. (AHM) was
established on February 18, 1993 with a
founding capital of DEM 2 million, as a
wholly owned subsidiary of Audi AG, Ger-
many. Daily engine output is 3000 of the
four-cylinder engines and 1400 of the six
and eight-cylinder engines. In addition,
there is local assembly of the company’s TT
Coupé and TT Roadster models, totalling
55,000 units a year. More recently, the A3
6and S3 models have also been assembled.
The huge site occupies an area of 68 ha and
employs over 4800 directly. Its activity and
continual expansion have brought substan-
tial orders to local suppliers of materials,
energy and services and to construction
firms, generating a further 4000–5000
jobs. The skilled labour supply is provided
by a local college of higher education. A
further positive feature is that good experi-
ences in the first years prompted Audi to
relocate some R and D activity on big en-
gines to a 5000-sq.m facility on a neigh-
bouring Győr site. The 80 employees work
on production technology, product devel-
opment and adjustments to local market
specifications. The new lab is developing
research cooperation with Hungarian uni-
versities.
However, it has to be recognized that
the social and economic importance of
AHM is only local and that the Hungarian
contribution to the products is very low: 3
per cent in case of the engines and 5 per
cent for the finished cars. The 16 local sup-
pliers contributed less than 0.5 per cent of
AHM purchases in 1999, when all 16 were
foreign-owned, such as Lear Corporation in
Győr and LUK Savaria.
The company operates in an industrial
free-trade zone. The sub-assemblies, pack-
aged in Ingolstadt, Germany, arrive in Győr
by rail. Assembled engines and cars return
to Germany the same way the next night.
AHM received 10-year tax relief, and has
channelled conglomerate profits to Hun-
gary, to cut its global tax bill. For example,
AHM registered net profits of DEM 544
million in fiscal 2000, on a turnover of
DEM 6.8 billion, which was an exception-
ally high rate for the automotive industry.
Major repatriation of profits from Hungary
can be expected after the ten-year period of
tax relief is over. It can only be hoped that
this will be offset by a wider impact from
the Audi project on local industry and big-
ger local orders.
In January 1990, General Motors and
the Hungarian government signed an
agreement to establish a joint venture for
car and sub-assembly production in Hun-
gary. Later, the German GM subsidiary Opel
Eisenach GmbH became the ultimate owner
of the facility. The original project envis-
aged an investment of DEM 250 million,
annual assembly of 40,000 units, and a fa-
cility producing 200,000 1.6-litre 8-valve
engines at Szentgotthárd. Favourable expe-
riences in Hungary, the availability of fur-
ther real estate and changing market de-
mands induced Opel to make further in-
vestments. The engine factory was ex-
panded (to include 1.4-litre 8-valve and
1.4, 1.6 and 1.8 litre 16-valve engines, as
well as engine sub-assemblies and gear
shafts), and the engine production batches
were doubled to 460,000 units. Unlike the
engine production, the car-assembly side
failed to meet expectations. Local demand
for new cars remained below the levels of
the late 1980s during the years after assem-
bly of the Opel Astra model began, while
liberalization of trade in imported cars from
the EU meant there was tough competition.
The Astra assembly was based on the rela-
tively costly CKD method, using packaged
sub-assemblies and materials shipped by
train. Consequently, Astra assembly never
exceeded 30 per cent rate of capacity utili-
zation and was terminated in 1998, in fa-
vour of a new CVT gear production plant.
Due to Opel’s human-resources policy, em-
ployees with indefinite-period contracts did
not lose their jobs. A total of 140 workers
were redeployed to the engine-assembly fa-
cility to start a fourth production shift un-
precedented at GM worldwide. Due to this,
output exceeded the nominal maximum ca-
pacity, reaching 510,000 units in 1999.
Another 160 workers were employed in the
assembly of Vectras for Hungary and China
(3000 cars). Retention of experienced and
reliable workers in reserve was a well-
understood interest at GM.
Although the company is among the
biggest in Hungary (in the top five for turn-
over), it is only one-third of the size of AHM
in terms of employment and sales. However,
GM leads in terms of profits. Although Opel
settled in Hungary two years earlier than
Audi, it has realized strikingly higher profits
and profit rates. Comparing net profits with
7net sales revenue, Opel achieved a 14.2 per
cent rate in its second year of full operation,
18.3 per cent in its fifth, and in 1997, an
astonishing 22.7 per cent. Cumulative prof-
its in 1994–8 were DEM 974 million,
which was DEM 240 million more than the
total investment since 1991.
How can this difference between Audi
and Opel be explained? The factor that
matters seems to be the two-year difference
in reaching full-scale production. Both
firms received the 5 + 5-year tax holiday
from the Hungarian government. Opel
started in 1991 and financed subsequent
investment mainly from reinvested profits.
Profits in fiscal 1996 and 1997 were paid
out (DEM 483 million as compared with
DEM 678 million investment), while 1998
profits were again reserved for further in-
vestment again (DEM 255 million). Two
remarks: first, the profit transfer was actu-
ally much lower than what is registered in
the books. Opel (and GM behind it) chan-
nelled profits from elsewhere to Hungary, to
use local tax advantages. Secondly, there
may be a significant difference between
German and American business strategies.
Overseas firms pay out a larger share of
profits as dividends.
More important than accounting and
profit-distribution practices is the impact of
Opel on the economy and background sup-
pliers. As with Audi in Győr, the local im-
portance of Opel in Szentgotthárd is out-
standing. Another similarity is that the as-
sembled cars and engines incorporate very
little locally added value. The last Astras,
assembled in 1998, had 10 per cent local
content, while the engines have 5 per cent.
The planned Hungarian contribution to the
CVT gears is 16 per cent. Nonetheless, GM
has a substantial Hungarian network of
suppliers. General Motors Europe’s total
Hungarian purchases exceeded DEM 300
million in 1998. Adding to this the DEM 50
million in orders from the Szentgotthárd
factories, it can be concluded that Opel, like
Audi, directly or indirectly generates over
5000 jobs in Hungary.
Third in alphabetical order and size of
investment is the Magyar Suzuki Rt. (MS).
The traditional, classic work phases of car-
making are performed in Esztergom (metal
forming, welding, painting and final assem-
bly). Because of the small batches, robots, in
the early years, were only used in the
phases most crucial to quality (in the
pressing and paint shops), while the weld-
ing and assembly were done with manual
support. As output volume has increased, so
has the degree of automation. Local em-
ployment is 1600, with an additional 2000–
3000 generated through orders to Hungar-
ian suppliers.
The Esztergom Suzuki plant was es-
tablished to serve the Hungarian and EU
markets. The Japanese investors met serious
difficulties in the first few years, after
opening the plant in 1992:
* Domestic demand was at its lowest, so
that it was hardly possible to sell more
than 1000–1300 cars a month until
1998.
* Local (European) content needed to be at
least 60 per cent to qualify for preferen-
tial EU customs tariffs. This was not
achieved until 1994.
* The recession in Hungary made it diffi-
cult to increase Hungarian value added
in the cars. Most Hungarian suppliers
were unable to carry out the smallest
necessary investment and the lower
batch sizes in the early years did not
promise them big profits.
* The yen loans taken out to finance the
first USD 200 million of investment in
Hungary became rather expensive due to
exchange-rate movements.
MS tried to master the difficulties by a
strategy of accelerating out of danger. The
three main elements of this strategy were to
expand capacity, diversify production and
supply, and increase efforts to increase ex-
ports.
Although the factory was a year late
in reaching its planned level of output in
1996, capacities were developed to a po-
tential of 100,000 units by 1999. The new
investment was prompted by the improving
business climate in Europe from 1996 and
8by increasing sales in Hungary from 1998
(see Table 3).
The original five-door version of the
Suzuki Swift model was followed in 1993
by four-door sedan more usual in Hungary.
Using the Swift chassis, up to 10,000 four-
wheel-drive Subaru Justies a year were also
produced in Esztergom. By February 1996,
the full range of three, four and five-door
Swift versions were being produced, along
with a small van. The Swift design was also
developed substantially, and in 1996, the
usual European standards were achieved in
comfort and safety. The newly developed
Wagon R+ further improved the range in
2000.
After the development of its domestic
supply network, Magyar Suzuki began
making Western European exports in 1994
(Table 4). Today it exports to 30 countries
worldwide, of which the most important
markets are Germany, the Netherlands,
Austria and the UK. Overseas sales repre-
sent 10 per cent of the output. Exports
reached USD 300 million in 1997.
According to established Japanese
practice, Suzuki tried to find a reliable,
long-term supplier for each item. First the
company ordered simple parts and then
gradually moved towards more sophisti-
cated sub-assemblies. This stable network of
local suppliers was not easy to build. Su-
zuki’s high quality requirements caused a
problem and the small runs made supplying
Suzuki less attractive. The number of po-
tential Suzuki suppliers was also reduced by
under-capitalization and a low propensity
to take risks. The development of the supply
network has slowed again since, because
the simplest items that do not require ex-
pensive investment and sophisticated tech-
nology have already been allocated, so that
new Hungarian suppliers face more com-
plicated tasks.
The European content of the Swifts
produced at Esztergom was 70 per cent in
mid-1998 – 15 per cent imported from EU
countries, 26 per cent manufactured lo-
cally, and 29 per cent coming from local
suppliers. The remaining 30 per cent was
delivered from Japan, which was not far
behind the stated target of 20 per cent (ba-
sically the engine and the gearbox) that
would still be imported from Japan.
Suzuki has 60 suppliers now deliver-
ing parts worth USD 100 million a year.
There is an important difference between
the Japanese strategy of Suzuki and that of
other carmaker towards suppliers, although
there has been some convergence in the
past 15 years. MSC develops long-term co-
operation links, establishes more of a ‘fam-
ily’ atmosphere. Suppliers can rely on Su-
zuki’s support whenever they confront
problems or need help in introducing new
material and energy-saving technologies.
MSC is a long-term secure market for sup-
pliers, constituting a valuable source of
technology and know-how and providing
financial support for investment.
On the other hand, Suzuki, unlike
Opel, does not provide other markets for
local background industries. There is no
data registered by MSC about the extent to
which their suppliers deliver to the global
Suzuki network. Japanese philosophy states
that although they provide support to sup-
pliers to achieve adequate quality standards,
they are not involved in the sale of outside
products. This means that when a product
has reached Suzuki quality, it is deemed
competitive in other markets as well.
2) THE BACKGROUND INDUSTRY
Background industry is the part of the
automotive industry whose output is not
finally assembled cars. It covers everything
from major component sub-assemblies to
the production of classical background in-
dustries. The production structure has
changed greatly in the last ten years. The
passenger-car industry in the COMECON pe-
riod, with 20 domestic companies, was
much smaller in size and importance than
Hungary’s bus and truck-making industry.
After the transition, bus and truck produc-
tion declined rapidly and the new Hungar-
ian car industry, coupled with the Western
9links (including subcontracting) developed
by many suppliers caused a marked shift in
the structure of the background industry
towards carmaking.
Firms in the background industry
usually have several production profiles, of
which delivery to the car industry is just
one. This is largely because many engi-
neering firms lost markets during the tran-
sition process and picked up opportunities
in the car industry. Producing large batches
for car assemblers was regarded as a poten-
tial means of survival or even the ultimate
opportunity. The structure of the industry
did not evolve in an organic way. Thanks to
the favourable conditions in the early
1990s, a number of multinational automo-
tive firms established affiliates in Hungary,
mainly in Transdanubia. These factories
usually perform classic subcontracting, im-
porting all the necessary materials and sub-
assemblies and exporting the bulk of the
final production. Due to the heavy concen-
tration of production and the large profits
allocated to Hungarian affiliates, the share
of this handful of firms in the total turnover
of the industry is greater than their share of
employment or value added.
Many Hungarians expected small and
medium-sized firms in the background in-
dustry to strengthen rapidly as the EU and
overseas automotive industry entered to
Hungary. These expectations proved to be
exaggerated. Most Hungarian firms strug-
gled for survival, and since they were un-
dercapitalized, were able to join in the mul-
tinational networks only on the lowest, least
profitable level. System suppliers, or first
tire suppliers are very rare, and most firms
had to accept second tire supplier positions.
The opportunities for R and D in Hungar-
ian-based component manufacturers de-
creased sharply with the decline of the do-
mestic truck and bus-makers. In fact, R and
D ceased altogether in many firms. It be-
came more typical to apply foreign tech-
nologies and techniques. Indirect deliveries
increased, which then increased depend-
ence and subcontracting ties. The meagre
profits that could be realized at this low
level in the automotive pyramid, have been
unable to support major modernization of
technology. The ascent of the pyramid ex-
pected by politicians will probably begin
very slowly. The 5–10 per cent investment
rate of Hungarian firms compares with 20–
25 per cent of turnover in Western Europe.
Compared with its geographically
closest competitors in Central and Eastern
Europe, Hungarian background industry
lags behind its Czech and Polish counter-
parts, although its position is improving.
The main reasons are shortage of capital, a
restricted domestic market (which discour-
ages the launching of new ventures), and
most importantly, the 40-year hiatus in
domestic automotive development, which
lost Hungarian suppliers their market
shares.
2.1. The carmakers’ criteria
Carmakers in developed countries choose
their first-tier suppliers from firms able to
achieve consistently high technical and
economic performance. This is especially
true today, when the global concentration
and lean production systems in the automo-
tive industry have reduced the number of
firms with which carmakers develop direct
cooperation links. The affiliates of big car-
makers do not usually become reliant on
local background industry. They prefer in-
stead to continue cooperating with tradi-
tional suppliers. Replacing traditional sup-
pliers with local companies is a slow and
burdensome process.
Any of the components of a currently
marketed car is the result of long coopera-
tion of carmaker and system suppliers (joint
development effort). Long-term contracts
regulate which firms deliver the different
parts. Since new models are produced in
quantities of several hundred thousand a
year, a new Third World assembly plant can
easily be served by traditional suppliers in
the first years of operation, when batches
are smaller.
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Big carmakers have centralized pur-
chasing systems, so that affiliates can only
employ new, local suppliers with permis-
sion from the parent. Headquarters put ap-
plications from would-be suppliers through
a long examination process, covering the
product and the producer. Central pur-
chasing can be illustrated best by a matrix
recorded by the parent. The columns of the
matrix represent the demand from the vari-
ous production sites for the various compo-
nents in the rows of the matrix. The costs of
the supplier’s offers are then calculated
separately for each of the sites, although
price, of course, is by no means the only
criterion.
The following considerations apply:
* What technology does the potential sup-
plier use?
* What is the quality of the product of-
fered and what materials does it contain?
* What sort of management does the po-
tential supplier have?
* What is the applicant’s corporate finan-
cial position?
* How much free capacity does the poten-
tial supplier have available?
* Is the potential supplier capable of pro-
ducing in large batches?
* Are there R and D staff available for any
quick adjustments and retooling that be-
come necessary?
* Is there tool production at the potential
supplier firm?
* Where is the plant located?
* Is the offered price competitive, etc.?
What other kinds of product are made
at the firm is also important. If a potential
supplier is also involved in a production
task entailing a commercial risk, coopera-
tion with the carmaker could also be af-
fected by any financial problem. Likewise
important are high levels of quality control
and management. Many Hungarian firms
have acquired VDA or ISO certificates in the
past few years, but German and American
carmakers have meanwhile tightened their
quality requirements and now contract only
with firms with a QS-9000 certificate. Fi-
nally, a potential supplier needs adequate
references. Carmakers usually prefer part-
ners with experience in the automotive in-
dustry.
Although the most important of these
criteria concern the triangle of price, qual-
ity and production capacity, practically
everything must be satisfactory before a
supplier is engaged. Years may pass as tests,
licences and permits are obtained, before
the applicant can start effective delivery.
The experiences of multinationals investing
in Hungary are interesting from this point
of view.
Carmakers hold occasional confer-
ences for suppliers. (Audi, for example, does
so every second year). Interested firms are
introduced to the requirements and qualifi-
cations necessary to become a supplier, so
that Hungarian background industry are
confronted by the burdens they will have to
face. According to Opel, 90 per cent of ap-
plicants are unacquainted with the produc-
tion technology required. The overwhelm-
ing majority cannot produce the material or
product quality required, in Audi’s opinion..
A further problem is size and the associated
lack of capital. Big carmakers are reducing
the number of their suppliers worldwide.
They are therefore giving contracts to large
and properly capitalized firms in Central
and Eastern Europe. Very few firms in Hun-
gary qualify in this respect. Furthermore, a
first-tier supplier must be able to develop a
sub-assembly according to the parameters
required for the final product. Firms with
adequate R and D capacities are very rare in
Hungary. In other cases, lack of suitable
hardware, knowledge of technology or lan-
guage skills causes failure.
Under the circumstances, makers in-
vesting in Hungary tried to convince their
established suppliers to follow them and in-
vest in Hungary as well. VAW, for example,
provides aluminium casts to both Audi and
Opel. Loranger produces plastic parts for
AC pumps and other components, and set-
tled in Székesfehérvár, next to the local Ford
affiliate. The list of instances is long and the
result clear. Of the first-tier suppliers in
Hungary, only a handful is domestically
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owned (MOL, Bakony, Berva, Kaloplasztik
and Perion). The 3–4 per cent of the local
added value at Audi, 5 per cent at Opel and
20 per cent at Ford come mainly from for-
eign-owned companies. With inputs not
directly associated with assembly, domestic
shares are much higher, however. All mak-
ers emphasize their intention of increasing
local value added. (In the case of Opel’s new
CVT gearbox, the target is 16 per cent.) But
this mainly means contributions from other
wholly foreign-owned affiliates, even in the
case of initiatives by foreign investors to
map and utilize the potentials of Hungarian
background industry.
One such initiative was the establish-
ment of high-level working committees by
GM and the Hungarian government in
1996. The Background Industry and R and
D Working Group continuously monitors
possibilities of moving various GM activities
to Hungary. This is not confined to the
automotive industry, for GM has promised
to consider investment and cooperation
possibilities in electronics, computers, tele-
communications and other industries as
well. Reports on the results are slow to ap-
pear and the initiative is hardly in the spot-
light at present, but this is obviously an op-
portunity that Hungarian partners should
be seizing.
The other undertaking has been more
successful. Ford Hungária was set up in
1997 independently of the Ford Alba pro-
duction company, to look for suppliers in
Hungary, Romania and former Yugoslavia,
for deliveries to Ford factories in Europe.
The Budapest office of Ford Hungária has
three tasks. The first is communication and
coordination with traditional Western sup-
pliers. The office tries to convince them to
invest in the region and monitors the activ-
ity of those already present. The second is to
seek new suppliers, mainly among firms
with experience in the automotive industry.
Thirdly, it fosters the cooperation links al-
ready established. Ford Hungária only for-
mulates recommendations, however. Deci-
sions are taken at Ford headquarters in
Germany and Britain. It may suggest a new
supplier if there is proof of a cost saving
compared with existing sources, at compa-
rable performances and wastage rates. Only
ten potential suppliers had been identified
by late 1999, one of them in Slovenia and
nine in Hungary, but all majority foreign-
owned.
There is, of course, nothing wrong
with having widespread FDI in the Hun-
garian automotive industry. Such ventures
are especially welcome from the employ-
ment point of view. Component manufac-
ture is usually labour intensive (for example
the production of cables). Some have es-
caped tighter Western environmental
regulations by coming to Hungary (for ex-
ample, in polyurethane production or alu-
minium casting). The skill and knowledge-
intensive stages of production have stayed
in the West. Only in exceptional cases has
any R and D been moved to Hungary, and
in those cases the labour-intensive devel-
opment tasks have been relocated. In fact,
there was little reason to expect anything
else in view of Hungary’s historical position
in industry. High-tech products from Hun-
garian producers have been almost exclu-
sively licensed from abroad or produced in
tight cooperation. Only a few locally devel-
oped products have featured (for instance
from Rába). Hungary represents only a
small link in the value chain of global in-
dustry and its entry and contribution were
only possible on the lowest level. Neverthe-
less, there are hopes that Hungarian back-
ground industry may move up the hierar-
chy later:
* because wherever there is production,
the need for development appears sooner
or later, and,
* because it is almost as difficult to get out
of the chain, as it is to get in. A car model
is usually made for 8–10 years, so that
the outside supplies are required for a
similar period. Furthermore, smooth co-
operation makes the best reference for
obtaining new orders or involvement in
product development.
It is also obvious that it is easier to join
a completely new project as a supplier than
to supplant a supplier in an existing project
is. The best Hungarian example of this is the
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joint GM-Suzuki project (SUB-S pro-
gramme), a development effort to forge co-
operation links based on the Wagon R+
programme. This has been joined by several
Hungarian partners previously unable to
join in the Swift production programme.
The Suzuki experience has been left to
the end of this account deliberately, because
it cannot be regarded as typical, at least in
terms of supplier-network creation. Suzuki
started production at a time of deep reces-
sion in the Hungarian car market. Customs
and other measures in neighbouring, car-
producing countries left Suzuki uncompeti-
tive. To reduce losses, a forced effort was
made to accelerate preparations for EU ex-
ports. According to Hungary’s association
agreement with the EU, there were to be
reduced tariffs, and from 1995, customs-
free deliveries if the European content of the
cars exceeded 60 per cent. Relying on im-
ports from the EU would have pushed up
costs too high, so that Suzuki made efforts to
source in Hungary instead. The accelerated
creation of a Hungarian supply network
was only possible through compromises at
the expense of economic rationality. Tooling
for small batches, for example, increased
unit fixed costs, but in the first half of the
1990s, many Hungarian firms were willing
to join Suzuki at zero profit or even a loss,
since they saw this as a last chance of sur-
vival or a vital reference.
2.2. The views of suppliers
2.2.1. Corporate background and privati-
zation
Like Hungarian manufacturers in general,
automotive companies faced the challenges
of the late 1980s and early 1990s from
widely different starting positions. Many
had specialized in the outdated demand
structure of COMECON and possessed over-
sized, outdated and inefficient capacities,
including a bloated, underemployed
workforce, leading to a low level of labour
productivity. The collapse of COMECON in
1991 had left them in great difficulties, as
suppliers to COMECON countries (especially
the Soviet Union, for instance in the case of
the giant bus maker Ikarus) or suppliers to
such suppliers. The situation was aggra-
vated by the concurrent liberalization of
imports into Hungary, the introduction of
the radical bankruptcy regulations, and an
overall increase in interest rates (following
inflation).
Many automotive suppliers therefore
failed in the early 1990s, and their assets
were sold off cheaply to foreign or Hun-
garian investors. Adjustment to market
changes was usually started earlier, and the
companies without previous debts could
properly prosper after the procedures. With
some patience and care, state owners also
could have enjoyed the financial results of
this prosperity. Contradictions of privatiza-
tion also thwarted adjustment of distressed
firms. Privatization was usually a long pro-
cedure until the companies could find their
long-term strategic owners being able to
provide capital and markets necessary for
long-term survival of firms.
Some of the privatization practices
typical in Hungary were also detrimental to
the long-term survival of troubled automo-
tive firms, for instance leveraged buy-outs
(MBO or ESOP schemes) or privatization
based on an emotional background proved
to be a failure in most cases. ‘Emotional pri-
vatization’ meant giving preference to non-
commercial factors during the privatization
process, for example favouring the conser-
vation of employment and activities, or do-
mestic over foreign bidders, which tended
to postpone the necessary adjustment ef-
forts. Ostensibly new owners such as the
state asset-holding company or commercial
banks acquiring assets through liquidation
proceedings could not or would not assume
a real ownership role. Reorganization, in-
vestment and sales initiatives were omitted.
Delayed or reduced modernization
and the consequent loss of production ca-
pacities and competencies thwarted Hun-
garian firms that were already disadvan-
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taged in international competition. A better
post-liquidation performance was usually
obtained by financial investors, although it
was often still insufficient. The motive of
financiers’ efforts to improve performance
was future sale of the firm to strategic in-
vestors or a stock-exchange flotation. Since
this could be achieved only through in-
creasing sales and profitability, such inves-
tors were under continual pressure to en-
sure growth. Where they had obtained as-
sets cheaply in liquidation proceedings, they
found themselves unable to build up the
capital from depreciation to ensure mod-
ernization or capacity development. Profits
were usually low. Such firms in the event
had little chance of becoming desirable in-
vestment targets for strategic investors.
Some firms were able to remain afloat
despite the hardships of bankruptcy and
privatization provided they avoided direct
confrontation with the interests of big mul-
tinationals, by serving small market niches
in small quantities, e.g. the demand from
MS. Many firms that lost their raw material
bases after privatization found themselves
in an especially bad position. Instead of
growth, they usually faced exit in the me-
dium term, or at best, dependence on a
multinational.
However, numerous cases of success-
ful adjustment also occurred. In these cases,
Hungarian automotive suppliers deliber-
ately prepared themselves for the coming
market changes and acted quickly and
firmly on them. Many managers in the mid-
1980s were aware that COMECON coopera-
tion was ailing and hedged by developing
cooperation links with Western companies
as well. Initially, this usually meant sub-
contracting, which taught Hungarian part-
ners how to produce automotive parts in the
required quality and make accurate, punc-
tual deliveries. Later developments were
enhanced by the accumulated cooperation
experience and the economic and legal
changes that came with the socio-economic
transition after 1989. Joint ventures were
established, and traditional cooperation
Western partners took part in the privatiza-
tion process. Subcontracting links were re-
placed by longer-term cooperation agree-
ments and supplier contracts involving li-
censing and know-how transfers. A further
step in most cases was an increasing local
added value in the sub-assemblies and ulti-
mately the complete assembly, with even R
and D moving to Hungary in some cases.
Firms that realized the necessity of de-
veloping Western cooperation did not
automatically survive, however. It was be-
yond the powers of many able managers to
overcome the endemic difficulties of the
Hungarian transition (corporate payment
arrears, poor quality of basic materials, lack
of supplier discipline, etc.) Nonetheless,
survival and adjustment in most cases de-
pended crucially on what corporate man-
agement did. A surprisingly high number of
Hungarian managers managed to reorient
their business strategies rapidly, making
sweeping adjustments, of which the most
important were:
* changing the corporate organizational
structure to comply with Western stan-
dards in the automotive industry,
* rationalizing and tidying corporate pro-
files – firms had to part with many ac-
tivities, institutions and facilities only
loosely related to their core competencies
(e.g. social infrastructure, own electricity
or water supplies, etc.), and with unreli-
able suppliers, but also outsource many
new activities such as cleaning, ware-
housing and transport,
* starting new business links at zero profit
that offered prospects of future profits
and engineering development,
* finding efficiency reserves by improving
loose cost calculations by participating
departments and making sure their cost
planning was efficient
* ensuring that partners’ requests could be
rejected only by the chief executive,
* improving on the performance of major
Western competitors in quality, delivery
potentials and many other aspects, in or-
der to gain international acknowledge-
ment,
* firms have to strive for localization as
large part of the production as they only
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can in order to increase profitability of
operations.
On the other hand, it was useless to
establish joint ventures for every activity
and product in an industry where profits
are low and there is substantial over-
capacity in some products even in Hungary.
The strategic goal had to be to increase out-
put of self-designed products, and most of
all, to grow. Only a firm with an annual
turnover over USD 100 million would be
thought large enough to qualify as an equal
partner for Western firms.
2.2.2. Corporate structure, foreign experi-
ences in Hungary, and criticism of
Hungarian managers
The stories of the largest foreign firms have
already been covered. Those of the smaller
ones active in producing automotive sub-
assemblies share many of the same features:
* Initially, investors in Hungary moved
mainly into labour-intensive, or technol-
ogy-intensive but environmentally sensi-
tive activities. Spatial proximity, ade-
quate level of infrastructure and legal
stability were important incentives, as
well as the low Hungarian wages, which
were a fraction (10–15 per cent) of those
in Germany. Later, the producers of la-
bour-intensive automotive products were
followed into Hungary by the producers
of their basic materials.
* In Germany, these firms were employing
workers with rights to a 35-hour week,
six weeks’ annual paid holiday and sev-
eral state and religious holidays. In Hun-
gary, they are able to run their facilities
round the clock in four shifts, so that the
equipment produces a significantly
greater output than it would in Germany.
Capital productivity is much higher in
Hungary. There is practically no trade-
union activity, as most employees are
happy in what for them is a relatively
well-paid job.
* Most of the factories in Hungary were
relocated from Western Europe and
brought their order books with them.
They were not set up as part of the re-
viving Hungarian automotive industry,
but as an export platform.
* The foreign parent in such cases provides
the technology and the orders, while la-
bour is the local contribution. Later,
some kind of local sub-assembly produc-
tion may be added, but the local value
added rarely exceeds 10 per cent.
* Hungarian affiliates have little room for
manoeuvre. Business links are decided at
headquarters, and so are prices and
profits. The parent chooses and tests the
suppliers. There is no need for marketing
or local purchasing or development. Cost
calculations are only made for the affili-
ate’s ‘own businesses’ (as in the case of
Suzuki’s local suppliers).
* This procedure is general in the Hun-
garian affiliates of multinational compa-
nies, because 100 per cent owned sub-
sidiaries are easier to handle, influence
and slot into the global network than in-
dependent Hungarian suppliers are.
Furthermore, they have provided chan-
nels by which multinationals can save
significant amounts of tax.
Initially, foreign investors were not
very enthusiastic about Hungarian industry.
They seemed to regard Hungarians as peo-
ple to do the simple work and only moved
final assembly tasks into the country. They
did not use local supplier capacities. Firms
engaged in investment and starting produc-
tion rarely change traditional suppliers for
new local ones. However, the success of the
Suzuki project influenced several other
companies and the interest of potential for-
eign investors in Hungary increased. There
is a major difference between European and
overseas investors. Large overseas firms
usually establish their local supply network
quickly, while the mainly smaller, European
suppliers remain tied more closely to their
parent companies and are slower in this
respect.
The experience of foreigners in Hun-
gary has not always been positive. Manag-
ers are usually appreciative of the qualities
of local labour (especially engineers and
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skilled workers), but they often add that la-
bour needs further training and managers
have to watch them carefully. This means in
part that they need potential sanctions be-
fore they perform properly, otherwise ‘they
steal.’
There have also been some negative
experiences with local suppliers. Firms in-
vesting in Hungary usually find it hard to
track down suitable partners for deliveries.
Hungarian firms often do not understand
what they were expected to produce, let
alone meet the quality and reliability re-
quirements necessary to become a supplier.
For foreign investors (and for Hungary) it
has been found best for firms to have their
traditional partners follow them here. Hun-
garian managers themselves admit that they
find the requirements for making a bid for
business with a multinational very compli-
cated. For many, entry into the network is
effectively obstructed at that very early
stage.
But the negative picture is offset by
many good examples. Favourable experi-
ences in Hungary have induced several
multinationals to move even R and D facili-
ties to Hungary. (Examples include Knorr-
Bremse and Audi.)
The next category of background in-
dustry consists of medium-sized Hungar-
ian-owned firms. The number of these fell
sharply during the years of transition and
most of them remain in a much worse posi-
tion than foreign-owned suppliers are. Most
of them lost the bulk of their markets with
the collapse of COMECON. They managed to
reduce employment quite quickly, but
found they could hardly sell their outdated
and excessive production. These firms have
had troublesome histories – emotional pri-
vatization with substantial capital pre-
emption (reduction) and delayed restruc-
turing. Many also have a troublesome pres-
ent, as parts of Hungarian conglomerates,
having to cross-finance losses at other divi-
sions. Despite these drawbacks, they are still
serious constituents of Hungary’s industrial
potential, because:
* They possess their own R and D facilities
and their own products.
* They have investment-project manage-
ment.
* They carry out marketing activity.
* They maintain their own maintenance
forces.
* They provide jobs (and know-how) for a
number of domestic SMEs.
* They possess valuable and still accessible
links with CIS countries.
* They can supply complete automotive
sub-assemblies in large quantities and at
standard quality.
In the view of managers, these firms
are at once too big and too small. They are
too small to invest on the same scale as
multinationals can and to avail themselves
of the generous tax and other incentives
from the government, for which there are
investment-size thresholds. Furthermore,
they receive no support in solving their en-
vironmental problems (cleaning up past
pollution). They do not receive state guar-
antees for investment credits, and they are
not usually located in industrial free-trade
zones, which means they are not exempt
from tax and VAT. At the same time, they
are too big to benefit from the state support
aimed at SME development, where the usual
ceilings are 250 employees and a turnover
of USD 8 million. These firms also require
special attention from industrial policy-
makers. According to managers, this should
include increased customs protection and
cheap development credits.
Finally, mention must be made of
SMEs, whose role in the Hungarian auto-
motive industry is increasing. They can be
regarded as winners by the transition proc-
ess and its associated foreign investment.
This applies especially to the partly foreign-
owned firms that have successfully joined in
the Suzuki cooperation network, gaining
much from the substantial support for tech-
nology development and machinery im-
provements provided by the Japanese in-
vestor, along with solutions to financial
problems.
The legal regulations allowed private
companies to be founded even before the
transition process began. Many engineers
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and managers previously in SOE employ-
ment switched to private business, usually
utilizing skills and connections gathered
over many years in their previous jobs.
These firms characteristically offer good
quality and relatively low prices, and they
are growing very fast. However, the growth
may run up against two main barriers:
* The increasing demand they face can of-
ten be satisfied only by making a radical
technology change (introducing new
equipment for mass production or mak-
ing other expensive investments. In most
cases, firms do not generate the profits to
finance such investment. Many manag-
ers also shrink from investing in expen-
sive machinery, at the still high rates of
interest in Hungary.
* On the other hand, many managers are
wary of expanding beyond a fairly small
size, because corporate indirect costs
tend to jump when the workforce ex-
ceeds 50 employees, so that other,
smaller firms may become more com-
petitive and capture business.
Many smaller firms have based their
prosperity on employing technologies and
producing goods that are still in limited
demand, but have been removed from the
catalogues of big multinationals. Other
market niches require manual production
of small batches of highly skill-intensive
goods.
Small size does not necessarily mean
that there is no development activity, but
multinationals do not usually buy inven-
tions from small firms, however environ-
mentally friendly and cost efficient they
may be. These inventions become a lot more
expensive after going through the complete
corporate hierarchy and receiving the nec-
essary refinements, so that the benefits of
them prove smaller than the costs.
Not all SMEs are success stories. Firms
that existed before the transition were usu-
ally deprived of their markets by market
collapse and import liberalization. Inter-
views showed that SME managers felt as
much at a disadvantage as the managers of
other Hungarian-owned suppliers. They
thought that Hungarian government did not
support them and that they were at a disad-
vantage compared with multinationals. But
they also blamed banks, which sometimes
called for HUF 300 million security as col-
lateral for a loan of HUF 10 million.
2.2.3. Experiences with new supplier links:
matchmaking, investment, develop-
ment, technology and quality control
It is not easy to become an automotive sup-
plier. Success depends much on the ques-
tion of who wants to supply whom.
Car assembly resumed in Hungary in
1992 after a 50-year break. The two multi-
national carmakers, Opel and Suzuki, es-
tablished their plants with completely dif-
ferent objectives. Opel only wanted to sup-
ply the Hungarian market. Suzuki wanted
to become the market leader in Hungary,
but also to use its Hungarian factory as a
jumping-off point for customs-free deliver-
ies to the European Union. Opel produced
only 10,000–15,000 cars a year and pos-
sessed a wide network of suppliers in
Europe. Suzuki wanted to produce 50,000–
60,000 cars a year initially, rising later to
100,000 cars, while developing a local net-
work of suppliers within two or three years,
to meet the local-content requirements for
concessionary tariffs on exports to the EU.
GM did not need Hungarian suppliers and
the small batches meant it would not have
been economical to use them either. The
few exceptions included motor oil and bat-
teries, which Hungarian firms supplied to
the Opel assembly plant at Szentgotthárd.
Suzuki, on the other hand, held seminars to
assist in recruiting Hungarian suppliers,
where the disassembled parts of the car
were displayed and interested Hungarian
firms were usually able to copy them. How-
ever, it was necessary to purchase a pro-
duction licence for each part from the
original designer. Hungarian partners were
allowed to introduce their own designs only
for ‘invisible parts’, but even for these, there
was a lengthy vetting procedure at Japanese
headquarters.
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Big differences were evident among
those applying for supplier status. Most
striking was the difference between foreign
firms with traditions in the automotive in-
dustry and inexperienced Hungarian com-
panies. The former were ready to deliver in
a few weeks, while the later needed several
months or even years to prepare. Major ob-
stacles for the latter were inadequate levels
of quality control, logistics, foreign-
language knowledge, and above all devel-
opment capital. Firms with a background of
supplying the state-owned bus-maker
Ikarus and with additional experience with
other carmakers (such as BMW, Renault
and Volvo) were noticeably better prepared
than the newcomers to the industry. Previ-
ous cooperation links also served as refer-
ences and provided a background in pro-
duction culture, quality and reliability that
enabled them to adjust to the Suzuki re-
quirements more rapidly.
As far as supplier quality was con-
cerned, Opel initially required of potential
suppliers simple ISO qualification, but in
1998, this was upped to the QS–9000-
quality standard. Another requirement was
on-line connections with Opel (using the
EDI communication system). Suzuki did not
make these stipulations, because the com-
pany graded applicants according to its own
set of criteria. Furthermore, Suzuki provides
much more support for achieving the nec-
essary qualifications than Opel does. Man-
agers of supplier firms report finding con-
tacts with Suzuki much more ‘friendly and
family-like’. Suzuki also provides technical
assistance, contributes to machinery devel-
opment and retooling, provides loans at
lower than commercial interest rates, and
organizes training courses to reduce the
level of substandard output. Suzuki is a
much more faithful partner, than the Euro-
pean carmakers. However, Hungarian firms
do not always have a good opinion of Su-
zuki. They mention here clumsiness in rela-
tions, long communication routes, and the
need for good contacts between multina-
tionals and the government.
Both Suzuki and Opel insist on a
framework agreement with each supplier.
This stipulates the various obligations of the
supplier and provides security against pos-
sible risks and hazards to both parties.
Initial investment costs for a supplier
range from HUF 1–2 million to several
dozen million, depending on the scale of the
orders and the product. Some companies
already had adequate technology, for ex-
ample because they had previously supplied
the Soviet defence industry, with its rigor-
ous quality standards, but even then, several
million HUF had to be spent on modelling,
retooling and test production. Investment in
machinery also contributed to the costs
wherever technology was inadequate. Su-
zuki was prepared to transfer licences and
know-how free of charge, but with Suzuki
partner firms, the Hungarian firms had to
make a down payment and then pay an an-
nual royalty.
The established practice in the indus-
try is for the carmaker to pay for the initial
tooling. Suppliers, especially smaller ones,
tend to buy the tools fairly soon, for fear
that their partner may move the production
elsewhere. This also explains why it is hard
to penetrate a supply network of an existing
model. Models are produced for 8–10 years,
so that a latecomer may find the tooling ex-
penses too high, while existing suppliers
have already shortened the period beyond
which they will earn a return.
There are further differences in the
status of GM and Suzuki suppliers. GM
suppliers may deliver to any European GM
affiliate, usually in batches of several hun-
dred thousand. Suzuki suppliers usually de-
liver only to the Esztergom factory. This
does not necessarily mean that the batches
are all small. Esztergom requires some com-
ponents in quantities of several hundred
thousand a year. Additionally, Suzuki
teaches Hungarian firms how to produce a
specific product efficiently, so that the sup-
plier firm may then apply successfully for
similar jobs with other carmakers or in
other industries.
The problem of small batches in the
Suzuki cooperation programme resurfaced
with the ‘SUB-S Programme’. Opel and Su-
zuki decided to collaborate on developing a
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small car, with product development to be
done by Suzuki and supplier recruitment by
GM. The results were mixed. A number of
new Hungarian suppliers (not previous Su-
zuki partners) received orders, at least as
second-tier suppliers. On the other hand,
several well-performing Suzuki suppliers
did not qualify in this round. GM’s insis-
tence on its own traditional suppliers exem-
plifies a widespread phenomenon, but many
of the Suzuki ‘dropouts’ accused GM of us-
ing the tender only to secure its traditional
suppliers against the threat of local compe-
tition. Traditional Hungarian suppliers to
Suzuki suffered a severe drop in demand,
since the production of the new Wagon R+
model tied down much of the capacity at
Esztergom, reducing the output of the Swift
model. There are a few suppliers where de-
liveries to Suzuki account for 40–60 per
cent of turnover. For them, the model
change may be very painful. Most suppliers,
however, have insured themselves by devel-
oping several parallel activities.
2.2.4. Prices, costs, profits, competitiveness
and labour
Managers often claim that supplying the
automotive industry is not a good business.
It is instructive to see who asserts this and
what reasons are given.
* The complaints come mainly from man-
agers with long experience of COMECON
cooperation (supplies to Ikarus or an-
other manufacturer). They find it hard to
adjust to the stronger competition since
the demise of COMECON and they need to
cater to a narrower, but more demand-
ing market. They now produce at a much
lower level of complexity in the interna-
tional division of labour, so that products
generate less added value and profit.
* Complaints come mainly from managers
at firms that still bear burdens inherited
from the collapse of COMECON. They have
remained in Hungarian ownership and
undergone a long and troublesome pri-
vatization process (e.g. emotional priva-
tization). Subsidiaries among them have
had to cope with the parent siphoning off
profits. Later hardships have usually in-
cluded troubles on the Russian market.
They usually possess oversized capacities,
redundant infrastructure, and a still high
level of debt that compromises business
performance and competitiveness.
* Another suffering type of firm consists of
Hungarian SMEs with supply links only
to Suzuki. They usually lack the precon-
ditions for developing mass-production
capacities of standardized quality.
Automotive cooperation gets a much
better evaluation from firms starting in the
business with no inherited obstacles.
Wholly foreign-owned greenfield invest-
ments or Hungarian firms without accu-
mulated debt or inadequate expensive ca-
pacities are able to develop and grow, im-
prove quality and satisfy the needs of fur-
ther automotive partners.
Competition is certainly fierce in the
automotive industry, but the same applies to
other sides of manufacturing. Product and
technology development have resulted in an
increasing number of driver conveniences
that were optional in the past but have be-
come standard today. Security and envi-
ronmental standards are also becoming
stricter by the year. All these features in-
crease costs, while the solvent demand for
cars does not increase to the same extent.
The whole industry is therefore character-
ized by rigorous cost and price-cutting,
which affects worst the firms at lower levels
in the cooperation and those that are least
innovative.
Managers complaining of low profit
rates in the automotive industry accuse Su-
zuki of dictating abnormally low price lev-
els. They suspect that the Japanese originally
planned for a much quicker increase in
production and sales, and are constantly
pressing suppliers to reduce prices after
several years of trading losses. On the other
hand, wholly foreign-owned affiliates and
firms supplying several companies in the
automotive industry think that Hungarian
suppliers are covering up their own mis-
takes by complaining of low profits. This
means that although profit rates are lower
than they are in the bus industry, makers
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are not asking for the impossible. They try
to push down prices as far as possible, but
they are not intent on pushing suppliers
into bankruptcy. In fact, Suzuki even checks
the records of potential suppliers to make
sure that corporate failures are avoided.
The relatively low profit rates may be
compensated for by the large order batches.
It is also important that contracts are for the
long term. Firms may plan their incomes,
and their clients are usually reliable, they
pay in time. This sector provides job for sev-
eral ten thousands of people.
In fact, carmakers demand a 3–5 per
cent price saving from their suppliers in the
long-term framework contracts, for three
main reasons:
* Suppliers only need to make major in-
vestments in the first year. They can
write off their capital costs after two or
three years, after which they only need to
make minor maintenance investments.
* As output increases, unit cost declines.
The increase occurs partly because of in-
creasing sales of the new model, partly
because of the rising demand for spare
parts.
* Carmakers expect suppliers to pass some
of the price cuts on to their second or
third-tier suppliers.
While these considerations make it
possible to reduce component prices, mar-
ket competition makes it unavoidable. Every
model counts as a novelty only for the first
two or three years, when sales may yield
some price premium. Demand can only be
maintained later by offering special series at
reasonable prices, equipped with a number
of further conveniences and appliances.
Since market success is in the interest of the
whole cooperating supply chain, everyone
must share the costs.
How can suppliers absorb a price cut
of 3–5 per cent every year? This is a com-
plicated problem, in which the level in the
automotive pyramid is material. Usually, the
more sophisticated the product produced,
the greater the chance of saving on costs.
Localization is therefore extremely impor-
tant. Firms tend to produce in house what-
ever they can. Luckily, there is a tendency
for carmakers to move to complete vertical
production structures in Hungary, ranging
from materials to final assembly.
Further opportunities to cut costs de-
rive from the competition among potential
suppliers and the discovery of internal
sources of savings. In the later case, the
carmaker may provide valuable help. Opel
and Suzuki both require continual price
cuts, but the latter is usually willing to sur-
vey the supplier, study the facility on spot,
and make suggestions for cost reductions.
Cost reduction becomes really suc-
cessful if output volume can be increased.
Apart from the gains from increasing sales
of a given model, spare parts can be sold to
other carmakers and demand for spare
parts develops over time. However, there
are constraints on the cost reductions ob-
tainable from these:
* It is not easy to find a new buyer for an
automotive spare part, because many are
specific to a brand or a model. Further-
more, the framework contract may limit
sales on different markets. At the same
time, there are examples of Hungarian
companies, having mastered the produc-
tion know-how of one carmaker obtain-
ing contracts from others for similar
products.
* The market for spare parts has become
increasingly regulated in the last few
years. The main tendency is for spares to
be sold mainly through the carmaker it-
self, so that suppliers are not allowed to
sell to other firms. Prices are regulated in
separate contracts. The position of sup-
plier is better in the markets for the most
important sub-assemblies (A-category,
highest-security priority). These markets
hardly allow any other product to be
used, but the original from the carmaker.
The risks of trying alternative sources are
very high in these markets. In less im-
portant categories, the supply is much
wider, including several cheaper suppli-
ers producing substandard quality.
It has been mentioned that foreign in-
vestors are usually satisfied with Hungarian
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engineers and skilled labour. However, it is
questionable whether they have met a rep-
resentative sample from the whole of
manufacturing industry. Multinationals of-
fer the highest wages regionally, so cream-
ing off the labour market. Many people ac-
cept jobs below their qualifications in the
hope of a career with a multinational, so
that multinationals may end up with an
overeducated workforce. This improves
Hungarian competitiveness. In EU coun-
tries, jobs are often casual or temporary.
The share of unskilled labour is high, re-
sulting in high labour turnover. In Hun-
gary, many educated workers take unskilled
jobs for fear of unemployment. At the Győr
Audi affiliate, the workforce is 100 per cent
skilled, but that applies to only 70 per cent
at the main works in Ingolstadt.
Hungarian suppliers can compete in
the East as well as the West. Many expect
Western companies eventually to buy out
Russian carmakers. The suppliers will then
be well placed, since they are cheaper than
Western firms are, but much better than
Eastern ones.
There are also some problems with la-
bour in Hungary. In some regions, qualified
labour is in short supply and foreign firms
poach each other’s employees in industrial
parks. Another problem is education. With
some exceptions (the link between Audi and
the Győr college), schools have no such
contacts with firms as they have in Ger-
many, for example. This precludes influ-
encing directly the structure of local educa-
tion and tailoring it to employment needs.
Instead, the fashionable skills preferred over
industry are ones in which the black econ-
omy places a big part and net incomes are
relatively high.
With competitiveness, the part played
by foreign firms in spreading the Western
industrial standards in Hungary has to be
mentioned. Although quality is not new, the
introduction of Western corporate attitudes
and philosophies affects economic integra-
tion much more readily than any adminis-
trative effort at harmonization. The best
results have come in product quality, where
Hungarian manufacturing figures are
among the best in the world. Less successful
has been the implantation of just-in-time
systems. Despite improvements, punctuality
measured in minutes is not yet characteris-
tic in Hungary, so that relatively high stock
levels are still required.
* * * * *
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TABLES
Table 1
Expansion of the Hungarian car industry
(1992–2001, units p.a.)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Opel
- Astra
- Vectra
9,401 13,344 12,282 12,488 11,255 12,715 9,350
4,008
Suzuki
- Swift
- Wagon R+
3,584 13,583 23,600 33,907 43,828 53,385 60,805 63,967
48
42,137
31,843
40,722
41,668
Subaru
- Justy 2,144 9,015 10,155 5,500 4,090 3,273 2,715
Audi
- TT Coupe
- TT Roadster
- A3
13,682 44,022
8,557
31,046
25,712
22,078
17,271
15,947
Total 12,985 26,927 35,882 48,539 63,033 76,255 89,337 124,692 134,011 140,401
Source: MSC, Opel Hungary and AHM.
Table 2
Increase in engine production in Hungary
(1992–2001, units p.a.)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Opel 20,511 75,741 160,033 266,051 310,034 368,048 416,830 511,813 480,030 399,945
Audi 18,938 104,159 196,352 584,665 986,773 1,001,912 1,060,828 1,220,217
Total 20,511 75,741 178,971 370,210 506,386 952,713 1,403,603 1,513,725 1,540,858 1,620,162
Source: Opel Hungary and AHM.
Table 3
Increase in Suzuki sales
(1995–2001, units p.a.)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
EU, Norway,
Switzerland markets 12,007,662 12,800,138 13,408,318 14,338,912 15,050,980 14,737,660 n.a.
Suzuki sales
Market share (%)
88,366
(0.74)
104,579
(0.82)
119,280
(0.89)
138,534
(0.97)
143,293
(0.95)
131,180
(0.89)
n.a.
Hungarian market 67,871 74,455 79,827 104,000 126,700 133,200 148,293
Suzuki sales
Market share (%)
12,177
(17.94)
13,821
(18.56)
16,040
(20.09)
24,834
(23.88)
30,800
(24.31)
27,421
(20.59)
28,352
(19.12)
Source: MSC, KSH (Hungarian Statistical Office), L’Argus and MGE (Hungarian Car Importers’ Association).
Table 4
Increase in Suzuki exports
(1995–2001, units p.a.)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Exports 3,290 23,900 37,000 47,700 35,000 35,546 49,522 56,120
As a proportion
of total sales (%) 16.97 66.20 72.83 75.12 58.60 53.58 64.36 66.44
Source: MSC.
